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Title Assurance In Sales Of California
Residential Realty: A Critique Of
Title Insurance And Title Covenants
With Suggested Reforms
JEROME J. CURTIS, JR.*
Typically, a Californian who purchases residential real estate does so
in the naive belief that the customary methods of handling such transac-
tions provide him with the optimum in assurance that he will obtain the
title for which he bargained. Although in most instances the buyer
succeeds in securing good title, it is submitted that the traditional real
estate practices in California do not justify this expectation. From the
negotiation of the purchase to its closing, the usual purchaser of residen-
tial property is seldom represented by counsel, and instead relies upon
the skill of a real estate salesman selected by the seller. The buyer almost
never obtains an independent examination of the title to the land he is
purchasing since he 'has been induced by longstanding custom to place
his faith in a title insurance policy containing numerous exceptions
which he infrequently reads and seldom understands. Further, the typi-
cal purchaser does not receive the benefit of any covenants of title
from his seller apart from the limited covenants implied in a California
grant deed.'
* B.A., 1964, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D., 1967, University of
California, Hastings College of the Law; LL.M., 1972, University of Virginia. Associ-
ate Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1. The "statutory grant deed" in California is a deed in which the word "grant"
is used as the equivalent of certain title covenants authorized by Civil Code Section
1113. See text accompanying notes 119-122 infra.
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It is appropriate in this time of "consumerism" for California to re-
examine this state of affairs to determine whether current practice
provides buyers with sufficient assurance of their title and, if not,
whether reform can be achieved. This article reviews the current Califor-
nia practice and suggests reforms designed to strengthen the purchaser's
means of title assurance. This article first examines several aspects of the
California standard title policy 2 and suggests changes in the law which
relates to them. The article then compares the California statutory grant
deed with the common law methods of title assurance and contends that
the latter should be statutorily revived in this state. These suggested
reforms are embodied in a proposed legislative package, found at the
conclusion of this article.
TITLE INSURANCE AS A METHOD OF TITLE ASSURANCE
A. General Liability of the Insurer
The standard title insurance policy generally insures only against
defects of record which are not excepted from coverage in the policy.
This standard policy also insures the marketability of the title.' Because
in most instances the policy only covers defects of record, the liability of
the title insurer may often turn upon technical rules as to what consti-
tutes record notice. Illustrative of the limited exposure of the insurer is
Bothin v. California Title Insurance & Trust Co.,4 where the policy
insured the title to two adjacent lots. After the purchase it was discov-
ered that the purchaser's property lines, as well as those of his neighbors,
had been mislocated by fourteen feet, apparently due to a surveyor's
error. Unaware of the error, the insured's neighbor to the west had
encroached upon the insured's property fourteen feet while the insured's
own predecessors had encroached fourteen feet upon land to the east of
the insured parcels." Sometime prior to the issuance of the policy, the
neighbor on the west had conveyed to trustees the fourteen foot strip of
2. CALiFoRNA LAND Tn-LE AssocuA~roN, Policy of Title Insurance (1973), (copy
on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter referred to and cited as CLTA Standard
Policy]. This policy is the standard policy used by California title insurance companies.
3. "Marketable title" has been defined as one
free from reasonable doubt and such that a reasonably prudent person,
with full knowledge of the facts and their legal bearings, willing and
anxious to perform his contract, would, in the exercise of that prudence which
businessmen ordinarily bring to bear upon such transactions, be willing to ac-
cept and ought to accept. It must be so far free from defects as to enable the
holder, not only to retain the land, but possess it in peace, and, if he wishes
to sell it, to be reasonably sure that no flaw or doubt will arise to disturb its
market value.
Mertens v. Berendsen, 213 Cal. 111, 113, 1 P.2d 440, 441 (1931), quoting Kenefick v.
Schumaker, 64 Ind. App. 552, 563, 116 N.E. 319, 323 (1917).
4. 153 Cal. 718, 96 P. 500 (1908).
5. Id. at 720, 96 P. at 501.
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the western portion of the insured's lots. This neighbor, Partridge, suc-
cessfully maintained an action to quiet his title to this strip by reason of
his adverse possession thereof.6 Subsequently, the insured brought suit
on the title policy for the depreciation in the value of his lot and for his
expenses in defending Partridge's suit, contending that the earlier deed
of trust from Partridge constituted a defect within his policy provisions. 7
Concluding that it was "quite clear from the conditions [of the policy]
that what was insured by the [insurer] was that the record title to the lot
was in [ the insured],' '8 the court rejected the insured's claim by finding
that Partridge's deed was not connected with the plaintiff's chain of
title.' In searching the record title, the insurer at most was obligated to
search the title back from the insured's grantor and then adverse each
grantor in the chain. However, in so doing, the insurer would not have
discovered any conveyances from Partridge, whose title was never incor-
porated into the record since it was founded upon adverse possession.10
Fortunately, the current California Standard Policy does not contain a
blanket exclusion of all unrecorded defects. Nevertheless, many of its
provisions relieve the insurer of liability for off-record defects."1 One
such provision, for example, excludes liability for "[e]asements, liens or
encumbrances, or claims thereof, which are not shown by the public
records." 2 It has been held that a recorded lease may also be outside the
chain of title, and thus may not be a defect covered by the standard
policy provision excluding the rights of possessors not shown by the
public records.13 Likewise, a title insurer is not responsible for defects
6. Id. at 720-21, 96 P. at 501.
7. Id. at 721, 96 P. at 502.8. Id. at 721-22, 96 P. at 502.
9. Id. at 722-23, 96 P. at 502.
10. Id. at 722, 96 P. at 502.
11. The term "off-record" here refers to any matter which is not a matter of pub-
lic record, either because it has never been presented for recordation or, if so presented,
is improperly recorded or outside the chain of title. An off-record defect is thus one
of which an individual has no constructive notice under a recording statute. The CLTA
Standard Policy contains, inter alia, the following exclusions:
Any facts, rights, interests or claims which are not shown by the public records
but which could be ascertained by an inspection of the land or by making in-
quiry of persons in possession thereof.
CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 2.
Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or
other facts which a correct survey would disclose, and which are not shown
by the public records.
CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 4.
Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice
of the exercise of such rights appears in the public records.
CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. 1, 18.
Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other matters . . . not shown
by the public records. . . but known to the insured.
CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 9.
12. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 3.
13. Diel v. Security Title Ins, Co., 142 Cal, App. 2d 808, 298 P.2d 873 (1956)
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discoverable in recorded plats which are not recorded so as to impart
constructive notice.14
It may be somewhat unrealistic to limit the title insurer's liability to
losses attributable to matters discoverable within the official chain of
title. Although the official land records in California are indexed under
a grantor-grantee index system, over the years the title companies have
constructed title plants of their own which are indexed by reference to
parcels rather than to parties. These tract indices classify records in
relation to the location of the property, which may make it possible for a
title insurer to discover defects which could not be discovered by the sole
use of the grantor-grantee index. For example, in a situation like that in
Bothin, it may have been possible to discover the off-record deed of trust
in the insurer's files.
Unfortunately, no California case has held an insurer responsible for
matters discoverable in the tract indices. Perhaps the failure of the
insurer to take exception to matters not in the official chain but nonethe-
less discoverable in its own records should be viewed as a tortious failure
to inform the insured of the true state of his title rather than as an
insured risk. Since there is a suggestion to several recent cases that title
insurers may be held liable for negligent misrepresentations of the state
of a title, 5 it would seem equally appropriate to regard the insurer's
records as part of the "record" for purposes of determining its liability
upon a title policy. Constructive notice of matters discoverable through
the insurer's tract index should be imputed to the insurance carrier, and
it should be estopped to assert that such matters are outside the grantor-
grantee chain. Although no statistical data is available from which to
determine the frequency of insurers issuing policies which do not except
off-record matters that are constructively known to the company, funda-
mental fairness would seem to require insurers to indemnify insureds
who incur losses because of defects known to the insurer which are not
brought to the attention of the policyholder. There is no justification for
limiting an insurer's liability to matters discoverable in the official
records where it does not wholly rely on such records itself; to hold
otherwise merely excuses title companies from their own neglect. In the
(distributees of a former owner's estate leased land by written instrument recorded
before recordation of a decree of distribution).
14. Stearns v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 18 Cal. App. 3d 162, 95 Cal. Rptr. 682
(1971).
15. Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 938-39, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 470, 485 (1975); Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 105-06, 112 Cal. Rptr.
126, 134-35 (1974); Hawkins v. Oakland Title & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 125-
26, 331 P.2d 742, 747-48 (1958); J.H. Trisdale, Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co., 146
Cal. App. 2d 831, 838-39, 304 P.2d 832, 836 (1956). See text accompanying notes 101-
118 infra.
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concluding section of this article, 16 a proposal for statutory reform may
be found.
Despite the numerous exclusions in the standard title policy, there are
several types of off-record matters which are covered by the standard
policy. Although the function of the recording act is to protect the
expectations of bona fide purchasers for value who rely upon the
records, these expectations are sometimes frustrated. Recordation does
not validate forged instruments, 17 instruments obtained by fraud,"8 or
instruments which have not been delivered.1 9 Nor does it protect the
purchaser from recorded instruments executed by those who lack capac-
ity,20 or from claims which are apparent from an inspection of the 'prem-
ises. 21 Likewise, a purchaser cannot rely upon recorded documents which
have been improperly altered.2 2 Further, titles founded upon void judg-
ments or decrees are not perfected by recordation of the judgments or de-
crees, 23 and claims based upon mechanics' liens or adverse possession
may take precedence over those of subsequent purchasers relying on the
record.24 Obviously, it is difficult for title insurers to insure against
claims which are enforceable although not discoverable of record. Nev-
ertheless, California title companies customarily accept the risk of sever-
al of these claims in the standard title policy. The standard policy does
not except to claims founded upon losses due to reliance upon forgeries,
false impersonations, incapacity, or a transfer by a person whose name is
different than that of the record owner. This practice has caused one
commentator to conclude that the standard policy insures. not only the
title as shown by the public record, but also the validity of all records
within the chain of title.25 Nevertheless, in one reported case, a title
insurer sought to avoid liability where a forgery had been recorded. In
Coast Mutual Building-Loan Association v. Security Title Insurance &
Guarantee Co.,2 6 an enterprising fellow forged a deed which purported
16. See statutory proposal following note 153 infra.
17. Hopkins v. Fresno County Abstract Co., 36 Cal. App. 699, 173 P. 106 (1918).
18. Deputy v. Stapleford, 19 Cal. 302 (1861).
19. E.g., Cox v. Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371, 156 P. 509 (1916); Black v. Sharkey, 104
Cal. 279, 37 P. 939 (1894).
20. See, e.g., Hellman Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Alden, 206 Cal. 592,
275 P. 794 (1929); Gibson v. Westoby, 115 Cal. App. 2d 273, 251 P.2d 1003 (1953).
21. See, e.g., J.R. Garrett Co. v. States, 3 Cal. 2d 379, 44 P.2d 538 (1935); Taber
v. Beske, 182 Cal. 214, 187 P. 746 (1920); Manig v. Bachman, 127 Cal. App. 2d 216,
273 P.2d 596 (1954).
22. Vaca Valley & C.L.R.R. v. Mansfield, 84 Cal. 560, 24 P. 145 (1890).
23. Parsons v. Weis, 144 Cal. 410, 77 P. 1007 (1904).
24. Bothin v. Calif. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 153 Cal. 718, 96 P. 500 (1908) (ad-
verse possession); A.A. Baxer Corp. v. Home Owners and Lenders, 7 Cal. App. 3d 725,
86 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1970) (mechanics' liens). Of course, there are other types of claims
which are not subordinated to recorded claims. See Chapland, Record Title to Land,
6 HARv. L. REv. 302 (1893).
25. Comment, Title Insurance in California, 39 CAL. L. REv. 235, 239 (1951).
26. 14 Cal. App. 2d 225, 57 P.2d 1392 (1936).
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to convey title to a fictitious person and then, using the name of his
fictitious grantee, secured a loan by giving the lender a deed of trust
which he executed in the name of the non-existent grantee. Thereafter,
the forged deed and fictitious deed of trust were recorded. 27 The lender
secured title insurance and, when the true owner subsequently quieted
her title, sued on the policy. The insurer defended on the ground that
the chain of events appeared proper on the face of the public record
so that when the policy was issued the true owner did not appear as
the record owner.2 8 The court, however, ruled that a policy insuring title
as "shown by the public record" should not be construed to mean that
the true owner had no title of record where a forged deed purporting to
convey his estate had been recorded.29 Admittedly, the title of the true
owner was clouded by the forgery, but she nonetheless had the legal title
of record:
If [the true owner] had conveyed the land, with the forged deed of
record, her grantee would have taken good title--clouded, but not
inadequate or defective. So it cannot be said in a true sense, or
without reliance upon technical niceties of construction, -that the
rights and claims of [the true owner] were not shown of record
when the policy was written. Furthermore, defendant was insuring
the title, not merely certifying to the apparent state of the title.30
Although the court conceded that the defendant could have specifically
provided in its policy that it assumed no liability for losses occasioned by
reliance upon forgeries,31 California title companies have not made
general use of such policy provisions.
Even though title companies generally guarantee the validity of the
recorded instruments, they do not insure against other off-record claims.
As has been mentioned, a grantee takes his title subject not only to
matters of record but also subject to any matters which could be
discovered by a careful inspection of the property.12 In addition, he has
constructive notice of matters which could be ascertained upon inquiry
of the occupants of the property.33 No similar duties of inspection or
inquiry are assumed by title companies under the standard policy.
Indeed, the standard policy excludes "[a]ny facts, rights, interests, or
claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be
ascertained by an inspection of the land or by making inquiry of persons
27. Id. at 228, 57 P.2d at 1393.
28. Id. at 229, 57 P.2d at 1393.
29. Id. at 230, 57 P.2d at 1394.
30. Id. at 230, 57 P.2d at 1394.
31. Id. at 231-32, 57 P.2d at 1394-95.
32. See note 21 and text accompanying supra.
33. Taber v. Beske, 182 Cal. 214, 187 P. 746 (1920).
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in possession thereof." 34 In light of this unwillingness on the part of title
companies to undertake a physical examination of the property, the
insured under such a policy has no insurance against easements, en-
croachments, the rights of lessees in possession, boundary discrepancies,
and similar matters discoverable upon inquiry unless they are also
discoverable in the public record.
Other exclusions in the standard policy include off-record matters
known to the insured but which are not known or communicated to the
company,35 defects created or suffered by the insured, 6 taxes and
assessments not shown of record,3 7 mining claims, reservations in pat-
ents, water rights, and governmental use regulations.3 8 The standard
policy also excludes easements or other interests appurtenant to the
insured estate. 39 For example, where land does not abut the system of
public roads, a grantee usually does not insure his title to a private right-
of-way across adjoining land for ingress and egress, even where the
private way is a matter of record. It is possible through negotiation with
the insurer to obtain insurance of such appurtenant interests, but the
typical insured purchases title insurance without the benefit of counsel
and may seldom consider requesting such coverage. Also excluded from
standard coverage are boundary disputes under a policy provision ex-
cluding "[d]iscrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortages in area,
encroachments, or any other facts which a correct survey would dis-
close" unless such matters are shown in the public records.40 It is to be
hoped that this policy provision will be construed by the courts to be
limited to minor discrepancies so as not to exclude any discrepancies
which would deny the grantee in any substantial way title to the area for
which he bargained.
However, it is possible in some locales to obtain coverage against such
claims by securing an extended coverage policy.41 The cost of this
34. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 72.
35. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 19(b).
36. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 9(a).
37. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 1.
38. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, %5, 17.
39. Any right, title, interest, estate or easement in land beyond the lines of the
area specifically described or referred to in Schedule A, or in abutting streets,
roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or waterways, but nothing in this paragraph
shall modify or limit the extent to which the ordinary right of an abutting
owner for access to a physically open street or highway is insured by this
policy.
CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 6. For an example of the
judiciary's dislike of this exclusion, see note 54 infra.
40. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. I, 74.
41. The only significant exclusions in an extended policy, normally referred to as
an "ALTA Policy" (American Land Title Association Policy) (1970) are:
Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police power unless notice
of the exercise of such rights appears in the public records.
Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, and other matters (a) created,
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coverage is higher than that of standard coverage, and title companies
seldom inform their customers of the availability of additional protec-
tion.42 Lenders, on the other hand, frequently require extended coverage
under a mortgagee policy. Where extended coverage is purchased, it
may sometimes be necessary for the insured to retain a surveyor to
survey the parcel before the policy will be written. From the point of
view of the purchaser of title insurance, it would seem desirable to
require title companies to advise purchasers of the availability of extend-
ed coverage, for under such coverage the only significant exclusions are
usually defects created or suffered by the insured and off-record defects
known to the insured and unknown to the company.43 Federal legisla-
tion has recently been enacted requiring mortgagees to make full dis-
closure to borrowers of the finance charges involved in the loan and com-
pelling sellers to reveal to buyers of residential real estate certain facts
about the sellers' relation to the property." It would seem to be only a
natural extension to require title insurers to inform their customers of the
availability of extended coverage and of the comparative advantages of
such coverage over standard coverage. A proposed statute requiring this
disclosure by insurers may be found at the conclusion of this article."
Thus, while most insureds believe that they are insured against all
risks, that belief is rarely justified. It is clear that unless extended
coverage is obtained, the insured acquires protection under a title policy,
with some exceptions, only against defects which are of record and
which the company fails to exclude. Of some solace to insureds, how-
ever, is the attitude of the courts in construing title insurance policies.
B. Construction of Title Policies
The traditional rules governing the interpretation of insurance policies
generally are applied to the construction of title policies. Acccordingly,
ambiguities in the policy are resolved in favor of the insured.4 6 In E. A.
suffered, assumed, or agreed to by the insured claimant [or] (b) not known
to the Company and not shown by the public records but known to the insured
claimant ....
Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation . restricting or regulating
or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of the land ....
A1mmmcA LAND TITLE AssOClrON POLICY, Policy of Title Insurance, (1970) (copy
on file at the Pacific Law Journal). The author understands that a few California title
companies are offering extended mortgagor's coverage to home purchasers at the same
cost as standard coverage. However, it does not appear that this practice has gained
widespread acceptance throughout the state.
42. This conclusion is based upon the author's conversations with several real es-
tate brokers in Northern California.
43. See note 41 supra.
44. 12 U.S.C.A. §2601 et seq. (Supp. I, 1975) (Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act); 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq. (1970) (Truth in Lending Act).
45. See statutory proposal following note 154 infra.
46. E.g., Paramount Properties Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., I Cal. 3d 562,
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Robey & Co. v. City Title Insurance Co.,4 7 this rule was invoked to hold
an insurer liable for a title defect. In that case, there had been a
dedication of the fee in a portion of the parcel covered by the policy.
Aware that this dedication had been the subject of earlier litigation, the
company excepted in the policy to the "[flights of the public or the
right of the owners of lots in the 'Austin Tract,' to use [the portion in
question] as a beach and athletic field."48 Noting that the policy stated
that title was vested in the insured, the court found the quoted language
ambiguous when read together with the whole policy and concluded that
the exclusion referred only to easements. 49 In fact, in the court's opin-
ion, the dedication did not merely create an easement-it transferred the
fee.50
Similarly, ambiguities in the description of the property in the policy
are resolved against the insurer.5 Also, in construing the standard
exception to defects "created" by the insured,52 it has been suggested by
one court that the term "created" refers to a conscious, deliberate
causation by the insured, and not to a merely inadvertent one.53 Further-
more, the courts imply that where a title is insured, ancillary titles and
privileges attached to the land may also be covered by necessary implica-
tion. 4 Hence, it would appear that any blanket exclusions which are
inconsistent with the coverage apparent on the face of the policy are of
no effect. 5
Despite the tendency of the courts to interpret policies strictly against
the insurer, in one rather well known opinion the California Supreme
Court refused to find any ambiguity in a policy provision insuring the
569, 463 P.2d 746, 750, 83 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398 (1970); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65
Cal. 2d 263, 269 & n.3, 419 P.2d 168, 171 & n.3, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 107 & n.3 (1966).
See generally 44 C.J.S. Insurance §297c (1945).
47. 261 Cal. App. 2d 517, 68 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1968).
48. Id. at 521, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
49. Id. at 522, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
50. Id.
51. See Coast Mut. Bldg.-Loan Ass'n v. Sec. Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 14 Cal. App.
2d 225, 229, 57 P.2d 1392, 1393-94 (1936).
52. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Schedule B, pt. 1, 9(a).
53. Hansen v. W. Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 535-36, 33 Cal. Rptr. 668,
671 (1963). The Hansen court also indicated that it was "inclined to make an outright
restriction of the word 'created', as used in the policy, to an intentional doing by the
insured." Id.
54. Murray v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 248, 58 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1967). In Murray, the court summarily dismissed the insurer's assertion of policy ex-
clusions inconsistent with the protection on the face of the policy:
We are not impressed with this defense, and we have no hesitancy in finding
the title company's blanket exclusions from the coverage of its policy wholly
inconsistent with the protection which the face of the policy purports to offer
.... When a title company insures an owner's title to property, by implica-
tion it likewise insures the presumed ancillary titles and privileges. ....
id. at 251-52, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
55. See id.
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marketability of title, even though the insured was precluded from
developing the property. In Hocking v. Title Insurance & Trust Co.,u
the insured was unable to obtain required building permits because a
subdivision developer had not executed an agreement or posted bonds
for the grading and paving of streets in the subdivision in which the
insured parcel was located. Although the county recorder had accepted
a subdivision map showing streets within the subdivision, a local ordi-
nance precluded development until the agreement and bonds were forth-
coming.57 The court reasoned that the recordation of this map operated
to give the insured title to the land and that it was merely the condition
of the land, not the state of the title, which rendered the property
unmarketable. 58 Thus, the court found a distinction between the mar-
ketability of title and the marketability of the land itself, and therefore
strictly interpreted only the portion of the policy relating to title. As the
court noted, "[o]ne can hold perfect title to land that is valueless; one
can have marketable title to land while the land itself is unmarketa-
ble."'59 This result obtained in spite of the fact that the policy description
referred to a plat which showed the streets, and over the dissent of
Justice Carter, who argued that the insured "guaranteed also the title to
at least a private easement in the streets.""0 It is submitted that the
average purchaser of a title policy would not be impressed with the
subtle distinction drawn by the majority of the court and that indeed the
policy contained an ambiguity which should have been resolved in favor
of the insured. The concluding section of this article contains a suggest-
ed statutory resolution of this problem."'
C. Assignment of Title Policies
According to the standard policy provisions, the liability of a title
insurer extends only to the insured and those who succeed to the
insured's interest by operation of law. 62 Thus, unlike several common
law title covenants, 83 title insurance may not run with the land so as to
benefit grantees of the insured. As a result, it is the current practice for
each purchaser to secure a new title policy, and there are no reported
56. 37 Cal. 2d 644, 234 P.2d 625 (1951).
57. Id. at 646-47 & n.2, 234 P.2d at 625-26 & n.2.
58. Id. at 651, 234 P.2d at 629.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 653, 234 P.2d at 630 (Carter, J., dissenting).
61. See statutory proposal following note 155 infra.
62. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Conditions and Stipulations, 12(b).
With one exception, discussed at note 72 infra, policy coverage continues only "so long
as such insured retains an estate or interest in the land .... " CLTA Standard
Policy, supra note 2, Conditions and Stipulations, 2(b).
63. The common law or English covenants of title are discussed at a later point.
See text accompanying notes 131-148 infra.
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cases of a California grantor assigning his policy to his grantee. Al-
though it is established that some types of indemnity insurance cannot
be assigned prior to a loss without the consent of the insurer, it is the
author's contention that title insurance is a unique form of indemnity
insurance, and that therefore assignments of title policies should be
enforceable in favor of the named insured's grantee.
The traditional justification for the rule that assignments of certain
types of policies are not enforceable has usually been articulated in cases
involving casualty insurance. 64 In such instances, the rule is obviously
defensible because the insurer selects the insured as an acceptable risk,
with some discrimination, considering the care which the latter is likely
to exhibit over the insured property. The risk assumed by the casualty
insurer would be beyond its control if its policies were assignable
without its consent, for it would then lose the opportunity of selecting its
insured. This consideration, however, is absent in the context of title
insurance since the risk of the title insurer is fixed at the writing of
the policy. It is solely by virtue of claims existing at the time the policy is
issued that the title insurer will ever suffer loss; and assignment of the
policy will have no effect upon that risk. Furthermore, Section 520 of
the Insurance Code voids policy provisions which purport to preclude
the assignment of any claim against an insurer by an insured where a
loss has already occurred. 5 Thus, after a loss has been suffered, the
insured under a fire policy may assign his right to collect under the
policy.66 This follows from the fact that the insurer's liability has been
established before the assignment of the casualty policy. However, since
there is no difference in the insurer's liability under a title policy
between a pre-loss and a post-loss assignment, it would seem that the
public policy underlying section 520 should dictate that a title policy
provision denying policy rights to assignees be denied enforcement. 7
California has already statutorily validated assignments of life and disa-
bility policies,6" and similar treatment should be accorded title policies
since the assignment of a title policy has even less effect on the insurer's
risk than the transfer of a life or disability policy.69
64. Bergson v. Builder's Ins. Co., 38 Cal. 541 (1869); Bibend v. Liverpool & Lon-
don Fire & Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 79 (1866); Greco v. Oregon Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 191
Cal. App. 2d 674, 12 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1961). See also Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group,
230 Cal. App. 2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1964).
65. "An agreement not to transfer the claim of the insured against the insurer after
a loss has happened, is void if made before the loss except as otherwise provided.
CAL. INs. CODE §520.
66. Gillis v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 238 Cal. App. 2d 408, 47 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1965).
67. Cf. Cook v. Cook, 17 Cal. 2d 639, 111 P.2d 322 (1941) (discussing the pub-
lic policy favoring assignments of life insurance policies).
68. See CAL. INS. CODE §10130.
69. Enforcement of assignments of life and disability policies may encourage the
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The only possible defense of title policy provisions limiting coverage
to the named insured and those who succeed to his interest by operation
of law is that perhaps premium rates have been based upon the assump-
tion that the provisions are enforceable. Even though it is difficult to
ascertain the relationship between these provisions and the premium
rates, the title companies themselves tacitly concede the impropriety of
collecting multiple premiums for nearly identical risks, for they often
charge reduced rates when a policy is written on a title which has
previously been insured by the same insurer.70 Further, for reasons
discussed later,71 it is doubtful whether enforcement of title policy
assignments will reduce the number of policies written, and thus title
insurers need not fear that such assignments will seriously diminish
revenues. However, even if it can be demonstrated that the profits of title
insurers would decline if policy assignments were enforceable, it would
seem preferable from a public policy standpoint that their revenues
decline, rather than have the companies profit as a result of forcing
grantees to purchase policies covering risks previously assumed by the
insurers.
Although the standard policy may preclude effective assignments, it
does recognize that the insured may have rights upon the policy which
survive his conveyance of the insured parcel to another. The insurer
under such a policy agrees to indemnify the insured for any losses he
sustains in an action by his successors upon any title convenant he has
given his grantee if that covenant has been breached because of a defect
covered in the policy.72 In California, however, this provision of the
policy is normally meaningless since in most transactions the grantor
does not warrant the title against claims antedating his acquisition of
title.73 Therefore, since the insurer is answerable only for defects arising
assignees to hasten the death or disability insured against in the policies, but it is diffi-
cult to conceive of a similar problem with regard to the assignment of title policies.
70. In limited circumstances, it is the current practice in California for title com-
panies to recognize the equities of this argument by offering lower premiums when a
policy is issued within a short period of time after the issuance of an earlier policy by
the same company insuring the same title (e.g., within two years of the writing of the
existing policy).
71. See text preceding note 74 infra.
72. The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy,
in favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an estate or interest in
the land, or owns an indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given
by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as such insured shall have liability
by reason of covenants of warranty made by such insured in any transfer or
conveyance of such estate or interest; provided, however, this policy shall not
continue in force in favor of any purchaser from such insured of either said
estate or interest or the indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage
given to such insured.
CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Conditions and Stipulations, 12(b).
73. See text accompanying notes 120-123 infra.
1976 / California Residential Realty
before title vested in the insured, there is little likelihood of recovery
against the insurer because of the insured's liability on his title cove-
nants. Yet, it seems paradoxical that the title companies purport to give
this additional protection to the insured and at the same time prevent the
insured from assigning the policy. Perhaps the title companies prefer
that their insureds do indirectly what they are precluded by the policy
from doing directly; that is, the companies would have their insureds
give their grantees broader title covenants rather than merely assign
their policies.
Of course, it is unlikely that a subsequent purchaser of previously
insured property would be adequately insured by merely taking an
assignment of his predecessor's title policy, since the value of the land
will normally have appreciated in the interim. Even if assignments were
permitted, a later purchaser should secure additional protection which
reflects the difference between the face amount of the existing policy
and his purchase price. Furthermore, new liens or encumbrances may
have been imposed upon the land since the issuance of the existing
policy, and therefore a purchaser should obtain an updated policy.
Nevertheless, assignments should be recognized and provision should be
made for reducing premiums where a policy is issued on land which has
been previously insured by the same insurer to reflect the fact that some
risks have already been examined and covered by the company.74
Until California grantors begin to assign their title policies to their
grantees, the dearth of case law in this area will continue. Perhaps, in
those few instances where grantees are represented by counsel, the
attorneys should attempt to secure title policy assignments from gran-
tors. On the other hand, it is arguable that the mere transfer of title
should operate as an implied assignment of the grantor's policy. Such a
result, however, appears to be precluded under Section 305 of the
Insurance Code, which provides that the mere transfer of the insured
subject matter does not transfer the insurance. For reasons already
stated, it is difficult to conceive of policy reasons justifying the applica-
tion of this rule to title insurance. In several other jurisdictions, courts
deciding the rights of grantees under title covenants given by prior
grantors have held that those covenants confer indirect benefits on the
grantee even where the title covenants are not those which run with the
land.7 Thus, it has been held that where A gives B a covenant of seisin
74. Cf. note 70 supra.
75. E.g., Brinton v. Johnson, 35 Ida. 656, 208 P. 1028 (1922); Schefield v. Iowa
Homestead Co., 32 Iowa 317, 7 Am. Rep. 97 (1871); Anderson v. Larson, 177 Minn.
606, 225 NAW. 902 (1929); Brunt v. McLaurin, 178 Miss. 86, 172 So. 309 (1937); Tal-
bert v. Grist, 198 Mo. App. 492, 201 S.W. 906 (1918); Cheves v. City Council of
Charleston, 140 S.C. 423, 138 S.E. 867 (1927).
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and B subsequently conveys the property to C, C can maintain an action
against A for breach of the covenant of seisin. Although this covenant is
broken at the time of the conveyance to B, B thereafter has a chose in
action against A for breach, if any, on the covenant, which passes to C
by implication.76 While there may be no breach of the duties of a title
insurer until an adverse claim has been asserted, there would seem to be
no objection to treating a conveyance as an implied assignment of the
grantor's title policy. True, the grantor's policy has not been converted
into a chose in action, but as discussed previously, there is also no
increased exposure for the insurer in allowing the assignment before an
actual loss. Therefore, statutory recognition of the enforceability of title
policy assignments should be given in California. A proposed statute to
this effect is found in the concluding section.78
D. Actions on Title Policies
The liability of a title insurer does not arise until such time as the
insured has suffered loss or damage resulting from defects covered by
the policy.79 In order for the action to lie, there must be an ouster of the
insured or the assertion of a superior or inconsistent title; 0 the mere
existence of a paramount claim will not give rise to such an action."1
Furthermore, the standard policy requires the insured to notify the
insurer of any claim adverse to the title as insured.8 2 Therefore, the
76. Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. Fullen, 114 Mo. App. 633, 91 S.W. 58 (1905).
77. See text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
78. See statutory proposal following note 156 infra.
79. The Standard Policy requires the insurer to indemnify the insured only for loss
or damage, not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in the policy, and for costs,
attorney's fees, and expenses of litigation carried on by the insured with the company's
written authorization. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Conditions and Stipulations,
6(b).
80. Overholtzer v. N. Counties Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 2d 113, 127, 253 P.2d 116,
123 (1953); see also Hansen v. W. Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 33 Cal. Rptr.
668 (1963). Since title insurance is essentially indemnity insurance, it might be argued
that a cause of action thereunder does not accrue until such time as the insured has been
physically ousted or has suffered an adverse judgment divesting or curtailing his title.
Under other kinds of indemnity policies, it has been held that the limitation period does
not commence until a final judgment has been entered fixing the insured's loss. Case
v. Sun Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 473, 23 P. 534 (1890); Sutherland v. Calif. Highways Indem.
Exch., 88 Cal. App. 724, 264 P. 278 (1928). However, Section 339 of the Code of
Civil Procedure makes it clear that it is the discovery of the loss or damage, not the
damage of loss itself, which triggers the running of the statute in title insurance cases,
and it has been held that the insured under such a policy discovers his loss not upon
suffering an adverse judgment respecting his title, but upon learning that a suit concern-
ing that title has been instituted. Hansen v. W. Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 531,
538, 33 Cal. Rptr. 668, 672-73 (1963).
81. Overholtzer v. N. Counties Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 2d 113, 127, 253 P.2d 116,
123 (1953).
82. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Conditions and Stipulations, 3. How-
ever, breach of his obligations under this clause will not work a forfeiture of the in-
sured's policy rights unless the insurer has been substantially prejudiced thereby. Moe
v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 289, 301-02, 98 Cal. Rptr. 547, 555
(1971).
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insured may forfeit his rights under the policy if he fails to advise the
company of any known adverse claim. This provision of the policy,
however, does not obligate the insured to locate potential adverse claims;
he must only inform the company of those claims which are actually
asserted, whether by the institution of suit or otherwise. Accordingly,
title insurance differs from the present title convenants,88 which give rise
to a cause of action immediately upon their making. Likewise, the
statute of limitations for actions on title policies does not commence
running until discovery of actual loss or damage by the insured.84
However, it is the date of actual discovery of the loss, not the date when
discovery of the adverse interest would have been possible, which trig-
gers the statute. 5 Yet, the mere assertion of a superior claim which is
communicated to the insured constitutes "loss or damage" within the
meaning of the statute.88
The liability of a title insurer, however, reaches beyond mere indem-
nification, for it is obligated to defend the insured's title whenever that
title, as insured, is challenged in the courts.87 Should the company fail to
honor this latter obligation, it exposes itself to liability in excess of the
policy limits. For example, in Kapelus v. United Title Guaranty Co.,88
the insurer without justification refused to defend the insured's title in
bankruptcy proceedings wherein the bankrupt claimed that the insured
held only a mortgage in the land whereas the policy guaranteed that the
fee was in the insured. 9 The court noted that the wrongful failure of a
title company to represent the insured in the action assailing his title
resulted in the company's liability for the costs and losses incurred by
the insured in defending the action, even though the judgment rendered
was predicated on theories not within the policy coverage.9° Further, the
insurer in such instances will be bound by the material findings of the
trier-of-fact in the suit against the insured. 9 Therefore, if the suit results
in a finding that the insured's title is inferior to that of the adverse
claimant, that finding cannot be controverted by the title insurer in a
subsequent action on the policy. Moreover, the initial judgment against
83. These covenants are the covenant of seisin, the covenant of right to convey,
and the covenant for further assurances. See text accompanying notes 131-136 infra.
84. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §339.
85. Hansen v. W. Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 538, 33 Cal. Rptr. 668,
672-73 (1963).
86. See id.
87. CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Conditions and Stipulations, 13(a).
88. 15 Cal. App. 3d 648, 93 Cal. Rptr. 278 (1971).
89. Id. at 652, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
90. Id. at 653, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
91. Id. at 654, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 281, citing Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
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the insured, or a good faith settlement made by the insured, raises a
presumption that the insurer is liable on the policyY2
It is not always a simple task to determine when the company's duty
to defend arises since actions against the insured do not always make it
clear that the plaintiff's allegations raise issues relative the insured's
title. For example, the complaint may allege only that the insured is
encroaching on the plaintiff's land. However, it is the duty of the insurer
to "defend its insured whenever it ascertains facts which [give] rise to
the potential liability under the policy. '93 Hence, if the insured in such a
case notifies the company of the suit and the company can reasonably
deduce that the alleged encroachment has been occasioned by the
insured's reliance on the description of his title on the policy, the
company will be bound to defend the action. 4
It seems that the present law providing that a cause of action on a title
policy should not accrue until the insured discovers a paramount claim
is appropriate. The insured, after all, has paid a premium in order to
place the risk of future developments on the insurer. Due to the myriad
fact patterns in which the issue of "discovery of actual loss or damage"
may arise, and in view of the care with which the courts have guarded
the interests of policyholders when the issue has been litigated,C it
seems best to leave the resolution of questions relating to the accrual of
actions on title policies to the courts.
E. Tort Liability of Title Insurers
Aside from its liability under a title policy, there remains the issue of
a title company's liability as an abstractor. It is well established that title
companies are answerable for their negligence in searching, examining,
and reporting titles where they have expressly undertaken the duty to
provide a title report.9 6 This liability may be founded in tort for negli-
92. Hansen v. W. Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 537, 33 Cal. Rptr. 668,
672 (1963); Ritchie v. Anchor Cas. Co., 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 250, 286 P.2d 1000,
1003 (1955).
93. Steams v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 18 Cal. App. 3d 162, 167, 95 Cal. Rptr. 682,
685 (1971), quoting Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 276-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
112-13, 419 P.2d 168, 177 (1966). See also Overholtzer v. N. Counties Title Ins. Co.,
116 Cal. App. 2d 113, 253 P.2d 116 (1953).
94. See Steams v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 18 Cal. App. 3d 162, 167, 95 Cal. Rptr.
682, 685 (1971).
95. E.g., Nebo, Inc. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 222, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 237 (1971); Steams v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 18 Cal. App. 3d 162, 95 Cal. Rptr.
682 (1971); Kapelus v. United Title Guar. Co., 15 Cal. App. 3d 648, 93 Cal. Rptr. 278
(1971); Hansen v. W. Title Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 531, 33 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1963).
96. E.g., Hurdy v. Admiral Oil Co., 56 Cal. 2d 836, 366 P.2d 310, 16 Cal. Rptr.
894 (1961); Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 P. 545 (1892); Viotti v. Giomi, 230 Cal.
App. 2d 730, 41 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1964); Mitchell v. Cal.-Pac. Title Ins. Co., 79 Cal.
App. 45, 248 P. 1035 (1926).
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gent examination of the public records, or it may lie in contract for
breach of the obligation to conduct the search in a prudent manner.17 It
may often be to the advantage of the insured to sue in tort since, in that
event, he can avoid the contract measure of damages normally applied
in actions on title policies and recover the full amount of any losses he
has sustained because of his reliance on the policy description of title
without regard to the policy limits.98 The difficulty in most residential
transactions, of course, is that the purchaser does not enter into a
contract with the title company for an abstract but rather bargains only
for an insurance policy. It remains an open question in California
whether an insurer who has agreed to furnish only a preliminary title
report0 9 or a title policy owes the insured any obligation to describe
accurately and completely the state of the title. The courts of other
jurisdictions are divided on this issue.'00
The trend of the recent California cases indicates that the insured may
indeed be entitled to rely upon the title company's description of title in
the policy and collect tort damages for losses occasioned in that reli-
97. "Generally speaking, the abstractor's obligation is contractual, and his contract
determines the scope and extent of his examination. He is liable for breach of his con-
tract, and he may also be held liable on a negligence theory for failure to exercise skill
and care." Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 123,
331 P.2d 742, 746 (1958), quoting 1 CAL. Jurt. 2d, Abstracts of Title, §8, p. 206.
98. See, e.g., Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975) (permitting recovery for emotional distress and suggesting that
punitive damages may also be recoverable); Mitchell v. Calif.-Pac. Title Ins. Co., 79
Cal. App. 45, 248 P. 1035 (1926). See also Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92,
112 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1974).
99. A preliminary title report is a statement by a title insurer to a prospective in-
sured that the former will issue a policy insuring title as described in the report upon
receipt of the appropriate premium and subject to such matters affecting title as might
arise between the time the report is prepared and the time a policy is issued. Although
a title insurer might argue that it assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of its title
description in a preliminary report since it is only agreeing to issue a policy in the future
in accord with the provisions of the report, it has been held that the presentation of
the preliminary report is the equivalent of delivering a title abstract with its incumbent
potential tort liabilities.
[In presenting a buyer with a preliminary report] [t]he insurer serves as an
abstractor of title-and must list all matters of public record regarding the sub-ject property in its preliminary report. . . . The duty imposed upon an ab-
stractor of title is a rigorous one: An abstractor of title is hired because of
his professional skill, and when searching the public records on behalf of a cli-
ent he must use the degree of care commensurate with that professional skill
:. ... IMhe abstractor must report all matters which could affect his client's
interests and which are readily discoverable from those public records ordinar-
ily examined when a reasonably diligent title search is made.
Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 938-39, 122 Cal. Rptr.
470, 485 (1975).
100. See, e.g., Quigby v. St. Paul Title Ins. & Trust Co., 60 Minn. 275, 62 N.W.
287 (1895) (tort recovery allowed); Booth v. New Jersey Highway Auth., 60 N.J. Super.
534, 159 A.2d 460 (1960) (no recovery in tort); Trenton Potteries Co. v. Title Guar.
& Trust Co., 176 N.Y. 65, 68 N.E. 132 (1903) (tort recovery allowed); Maggio v. Ab-
stract Title & Mortgage Corp., 277 App. Div. 940, 98 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1950) (no recov-
ery in tort).
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ance.1°1 In J. H. Trisdale, Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co.,10 the
plaintiff alleged that it had suffered loss as a result of its reliance upon a
preliminary title report which had been negligently prepared by the
defendant for the plaintiff's benefit and use. The trial court sustained
demurrers to the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had contrib-
uted to its own injury by failing to inspect the record upon receipt of the
preliminary report. 08 On appeal the trial court was reversed, and al-
though the appellate court's opinion is somewhat unsatisfactory in that it
fails to distinguish adequately between the abstracting and insuring roles
of a title company, it has been interpreted "as permitting a cause of
action against a title insurer for negligence in searching records.' °4
In Hawkins v. Oakland Title Insurance & Guarantee Co.,105 the
plaintiff purchased a title policy and ten years later discovered a prior
recorded deed not disclosed in the policy which allegedly affected his
title adversely. In one of his causes of action against the insurer, plaintiff
raised the issue of "whether or not, in California, one can sound in
damages against the other contracting party for negligently searching
the records as a preliminary to performing under the contract."'00 The
court in Hawkins reviewed the prior California case law and, although it
found defects in Hawkins' pleadings, indicated that such a cause of
action could be stated.10 7 Nevertheless, dictum in the opinion suggests
that the mere undertaking by a title company to insure a title does not
obligate the company to examine and report the title prudently for the
reason that there could be no liability for a negligent search or report
unless the company "undertook to search the title for their [sic] [the
purchaser's] benefit, and negligently reported the results of the investi-
gation incorrectly."'' 08 The court also observed that the defendant had
made no express representations as to the true state of the title.'0 9 Since
it was conceivable that the insurer would have insured against known
101. See, e.g., Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 122
Cal. Rptr. 470 (1975); Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126
(1974); Northwestern Title Security Co. v. Flack, 6 Cal. App. 3d 134, 85 Cal. Rptr.
693 (1970); Murray v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 248, 58 Cal. Rptr. 273
(1967); Colonial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Redwood Empire Title Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d
186, 46 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1965); Hall v. San Jose Abstract & Title Ins. Co., 172 Cal. App.
2d 421, 342 P.2d 362 (1959); Hawkins v. Oakland Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 165 Cal.
App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958); J.H. Trisdale, Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co., 146
Cal. App. 2d 831, 304 P.2d 693, 81 P.2d 578 (1956).
102. 146 Cal. App. 2d 831, 304 P.2d 832 (1956).
103. Id. at 833-34, 304 P.2d -at 833.
104. Banville v. Schmidt, 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 104, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126, 133 (1974).
105. 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958).
106. Id. at 123, 331 P.2d at 746.
107. Id. at 127, 331 P.2d at 748.
108. Id. at 127, 331 P.2d at 748.
109. Id. at 127, 331 P.2d at 748.
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risks not disclosed in the policy, the court likewise refused to character-
ize the policy description as an implied representation of the state of the
title."10
In 1974 the Third District Court of Appeal re-examined the question
of a title company's tort liability in Banville v. Schmidt."' l In that case
the plaintiffs alleged that they had purchased a title policy from the
defendant showing title in the Fullmers with a deed of trust outstanding
which had been assigned to the plaintiffs. In fact, however, at the time
the policy was written, the Fulimers had deeded the property to the
beneficiaries under the deed of trust and had thereby extinguished the
obligation secured by that deed." 2 Plaintiffs charged that the title
company negligently failed to discover the deed to the beneficiaries. The
title company defended by arguing that it had only undertaken to insure
the title and owed the insured no duty to search the title since it had
never agreed to do so for the benefit of the plaintiffs, characterizing its
role as that of an insurer only, not as that of an abstractor."1 3 Relying
upon Section 552 of the Restatement of Torts," 4 the court minimized
the distinction between the insuring and abstracting functions of the
defendant and concluded that an insured may sue in tort where he has
reasonably relied upon information supplied for the guidance of the
insured by a title company in the course of its business. 1' 5 Further, the
court was not impressed by the suggestion in Hawkins that title insurers
may knowingly insure against known defects: "In the light of modem
real estate and title insurance practices, as well as under the authorities
we have reviewed, an incorrect statement as to the vesting of title is
hardly. . . 'something which the insurance company in the conduct of
its business and in its best judgment' would see fit to make." 6 Unfortu-
nately, the holding of Banville is somewhat equivocal since the insurer in
that case had billed the insured not only for an insurance premium, but
110. Id. at 127, 331 P.2d at 748.
111. 37 Cal. App. 3d 92, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1974).
112. Id. at 97, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
113. Id. at 102, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
114. One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability
for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the information if (a) he fails
to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and communicating the in-
formation which its recipient is justified in expecting, and (b) the harm is suf-
fered (i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the
information was supplied, and (ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it
in a transaction in which it was intended to influence his conduct or in a trans-
action substantially identical therewith.
REsTATEMENT OF TORTS §552. For a discussion of the rights of third parties under
title policies and binders, see McMahon, Title Searches: Tort Liability in California, 7
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 257 (1967).
115. 37 Cal. App. 3d at 104-05, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
116. Id. at 92, 104-05, 112 Cal. Rptr. 126, 134 (1974).
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for "Title Search, Examination, and Title Insurance.""' 7 In view of this
fact, it may be argued that the case is consistent with earlier holdings
that an insurer has no duty to search and report the title unless it has
expressly assumed that responsibility. 118
It is submitted that the typical purchaser of title insurance reasonably
assumes that his policy accurately reflects the state of his title. Title
companies should anticipate that insureds customarily rely upon the
policy's description of the title and thus should be liable in tort when
such reliance causes injury to the policyholder. Such a rule is especially
needed in California where title companies hold a virtual monopoly on
the title abstracting business and where the general public has come to
rely upon these companies for accurate reports of the state of title. It
frustrates the expectations of the typical insured to perpetuate the dis-
tinction between title insurance and title abstracting. It is believed that
the legislature should act to remove any doubts which may exist in
California as to the current state of the law in this regard, and to this
end a proposed statute imposing such tort liability on title insurers will
be found in the concluding section of this article.11 9
TITLE INSURANCE AND TITLE COVENANTS COMPARED
In several respects, a grantee has less protection of his title under a
title policy than under the common law covenants of title. This is not to
say, however, that a vendee of land should not purchase title insurance
and instead rely wholly upon whatever title convenants he extracts from
his grantor or can enforce against his grantor' predecessors. Obviously,
title insurance frequently provides greater protection to the grantee than
these older devices if for no other reason than that title companies
possess the financial resources to cover the grantee's losses-resources
which a covenantor-grantor may not possess. Additionally, it may prove
difficult for the covenantee to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
covenantor when the former seeks to bring an action on the covenant
whereas it is less likely this obstacle will prevent recourse against the title
company. These considerations alone dictate that title insurance should
117. Id. at 105, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 134 (emphasis deleted). This is a common pro-
vision in the CLTA Standard Policy. See CLTA Standard Policy, supra note 2, Condi-
tions and Stipulations, 113.
Banville has recently been followed in another case where the court, without consider-
ing the significance of this policy language, relied on Banville in concluding that "a title
insurer is liable for his negligent failure to list recorded encumbrances in preliminary
title reports." Jarchow v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 917, 939, 122
Cal. Rptr. 470, 485 (1975).
118. See Sala v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co., 27 Cal. App. 2d 693, 81 P.2d 578
(1938).
119. See statutory proposal following note 157 infra.
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continue as a normal method of title assurance. However, because of the
several inadequacies of title insurance, it is submitted that the use of the
common law or English convenants of title should be revived in Califor-
nia to augment title insurance.
A. The California Grant Deed
Over the years the California legal and real estate communities have
succumbed to the easy habit of employing the statutory form of "grant
deed,"'120 which falls far short of giving to the purchasers the valuable
protections of the common law covenants of title. Although California
law permits the inclusion of the English covenants in any deed, 121 a
search of any recorder's office will disclose few deeds wherein the
grantor gives anything beyond the limited covenants implied in a grant
deed.
These covenants are merely that the grantor has not conveyed away
the estate described in the deed or any interest therein and that he or any
person claiming through him has not encumbered the property. 2 Thus,
under a grant deed, the grantor warrants only that the title has not been
impaired by his own act or that of his successor; he does not warrant the
legitimacy of the title itself. Indeed, the grantor may not even breach
these implied warranties by purporting to convey a title which he has
never owned, for so long as he or his successors have not conveyed to
another or encumbered this nonexistent title, there would be no breach
of the implied covenants. By comparison, the common law covenants,
which are customarily given in deeds executed in many American
jurisdictions, guarantee the title itself and not merely the previous acts
of the grantor and his successors.' 23
The grant deed was first recognized statutorily in 1855124 as a vehicle
implying the special warranties described above. This 1855 statute now
appears in Section 1113 of the Civil Code in substantially the same
form. Unfortunately, the policy considerations which led to California's
adoption of the statutory grant deed are now lost. Perhaps the statute
traces its genesis to an English statute enacted in 1707, which provided
that certain title covenants were implicit in a deed containing the words
"grant, bargain and sell."' 25 In 1850 the legislature mandated that the
120. A grant deed is one which contains no covenants of title beyond those implied
by use of the word "grant" in the deed. CAL. CIv. CoDE §1113.
121. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§1460-1470.
122. CAL. CIV. CODE §1113.
123. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 11904-911 at 1034-43
(abr. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as POWELL].
124. See CAL. STATS. 1855, c. 140, §9 at 172.
125. In 1707 it was enacted in England that some covenants of seisin, freedom from
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common law of England should be the rule of decision in California, 120
and it has been held by the California Supreme Court that the common
law includes not only the English lex non scripta, but also statutes
enacted by the English Parliament. 12 7 Thus, it would appear immaterial
whether the common law is limited to such English laws as had evolved
prior to the American Revolution, or whether it includes such laws as
were existent at the time of California statehood; in either case the
English statute of 1707 would be included within the common law.128
Regrettably, one can only speculate upon the motives of the 1855
legislature in creating the statutory grant deed. 12 9 Whatever its origins,
however, it survived the 1872 revision of the Civil Code13 0 and is today
the customary vehicle for conveying real property.
B. The English Covenants of Title
The covenants implied in a California grant deed warrant only the
prior conduct of the grantor and his successors; however, the common
law title covenants warrant the title per se. Three such common law
incumbrances, quiet enjoyment, and further assurances would be implied in a deed of
bargain and sale containing the words "grant, bargain and sale." 6 Anne, c. 35, §30
(1707); see also POWELL, supra note 123, 1904 at 1035-36.
126. JOURNAL OF nrum CALioRNIA LEGISLATURE, p. 823, 1123, 1204 (1850 Reg.
Sess.); see CAL. Civ. CODE §22.2.
127. Moore v. Purse Seine Net, 18 Cal. 2d 835, 838, 118 P.2d 1, 4, afJ'd, 318 U.S.
133 (1941), reh. denied, 318 U.S. 801 (1941).
128. See id. Cf. People v. Richardson, 138 Cal. App. 404, 32 P.2d 433 (1934).
129. Although the 1855 California Legislature had the benefit of the New York
Field Code of 1848 and drew much inspiration from that code in other matters, it chose
not to adopt the Field Code provision respecting title covenants. Section 489 of the
Field Code provided that: "No covenant is implied in any grant of an estate in real
property, whether it contains express covenants or not, except as provided by the Title
on Hiring."
130. During the famous revision of the Civil Code of California in 1872, an attempt
was made to revise the law of title covenants. Although this effort proved unsuccessful,
it does provide tome insight into the intent of the legislature if only to illustrate what
that body did not intend. This proposal envisioned a Civil Code which accepted as its
basic premise the provision of the New York Field Code that there be no implied cove-
nants of title. In fact, it was proposed that California adopt verbatim the section of
the New York Field Code quoted in footnote 129, supra. The proposal would also have
recognized two types of "code covenants" in addition to the common law title covenants:
"special code covenants" and "general code covenants." The special code covenants
would have been nearly identical to those implied in a grant deed: (1) against prior
grants made by the grantor; and, (2) against encumbrances imposed or suffered by the
grantor. The general code covenants would have been more extensive and would have
included a covenant against all encumbrances and a covenant of ownership. By the lat-
ter covenant, the grantor would warrant that he owned the property conveyed in fee sim-
ple, that he had peaceable possession thereof, that he had a perfect record title, and that
he would pay all damages resulting from any breach of the covenant. None of these
code covenants would run automatically with the land, although they could be assigned
by a covenantee to his grantee. By rejecting this proposal, it would seem that the legis-
lature was impressed with the simplicity of the grant deed and, while it did not abolish
the common law covenants, saw no reason to imply any more encompassing covenants
in a grant deed than had been provided for in 1855. [The author wishes to thank Mr.
Thomas F. Mullen for discovering the bill which made these proposals among the un-
indexed tomes of the California State Law Library in Sacramento].
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covenants are the covenant of seisin, the covenant of right to convey,
and the covenant against encumbrances. By a covenant of seisin, the
grantor warrants that he has lawful seisin of the premises described in
his deed; that is, he guarantees that he is the owner of the estate he
purports to convey.""' Clearly, this covenant is broader than the cove-
nants implied in a grant deed that the grantor has not previously
disposed of the estate or any part thereof, since it further warrants that
the title is free of defects antedating the covenantor's acquisition of title.
The covenant of right to convey is almost identical with the covenant of
seisin in that it guarantees that the grantor has the legal right to make
the conveyance.' However, there may be occasions where the grantor
lacks the power, or at least the right, to convey (e.g., he may have
conferred this right upon a real estate broker), and hence the necessity
for this independent covenant. This grantor's covenant against encum-
brances warrants that there are no liens, judgments, mortgages, or other
encumbrances against the property.'3 3 This covenant also offers greater
protection to the grantee than the implied covenant in a grant deed that
the grantor and his successors have not themselves encumbered the
property, for it reaches all encumbrances regardless of who caused them
to be attached to the land.
These common law covenants are broken, if at all, when made, and
accordingly do not run with the land for the benefit of successors in
interest of the covenantee.13 1 Further, the statute of limitations gov-
erning actions on these covenants begins to run at the time they
are given, not upon the covenantee's discovery of loss or damage, and
thus protection thereunder may be less long-lived than under a title
policy. 35 Since they are breached, if at all, when made, these covenants
are sometimes referred to as "present covenants."' 8
At common law choses in action were not assignable; 37 however,
they are assignable today.138 Nevertheless, the grantee of the covenantee
does not succeed to any existing chose in action merely by accepting the
131. POWELL, supra note 123, 905 at 1035-36.
132. Id. 906 at 1037.
133. Id. 907 at 1038-39. It should also be noted that under Civil Code Section
1114, the term "incumbrance" includes "taxes, assessments, and all liens upon real prop-
erty."
134. Woodward v. Brown, 119 Cal. 283, 294, 51 P. 2, 5 (1897); Salmon v. Vallejo,
41 Cal. 481, 484 (1871); Lawrence v. Montgomery, 37 Cal. 183, 188 (1869); Babb v.
Weemer, 225 Cal. App. 2d 546, 550, 37 Cal. Rptr. 533, 535 (1964).
135. See text accompanying notes 79-86 supra.
136. A. CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 774-75 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as CASNER & LEAcH].
137. See Morris v. Standard Oil Co., 200 Cal. 210, 214, 252 P. 605, 606 (1926);
Dibble v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 47 Cal. App. 112, 117, 190 P. 198, 200
(1920).
138. See CAL. CIV. CODE §954.
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covenantee's deed; an express assignment is needed to transfer the
claim.139 However, these covenants, if properly assigned, can create
rights in the successors of the covenantee whereas, as title policies are
now written, no benefits generally are available on the policies to the
insured's grantee's. 140 Several courts outside California, while accept-
ing the general rule that these covenants are broken, if at all, when
made, and thereafter create a chose in action in favor of the covenantee,
have held that a subsequent deed from the covenantee operates as an
assignment of the chose in action. 4  On the other hand, no California
case has allowed the covenantee's grantee to sue on the covenants
without an express assignment of the chose in action. It seems highly
desirable that the covenantee's deed should work as an assignment of
any rights he may have against his grantor for breach of these covenants
since any interest the covenantee has in a guaranteed title is subordinate
to that of his grantee. Additionally, the historical justification for the
contrary rule disappeared when California recognized the assignability
of choses in action."' Thus, a proposed statute to this desired end will
be found in the concluding section. 43
In addition to the three present covenants, there are two other English
covenants frequently given in other states. The first of these, the cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment and of general warranty, assures the grantee
that he will not be dispossessed or disturbed by a paramount tie. 44 An
actual or constructive eviction under a superior title gives rise to an
action for breach of this covenant. Moreover, the mere assertion of such
a right to evict, if valid, will also give rise to a cause of action. 1, The
other of these covenants is that for further assurances, by which the
grantor agrees that he will perform all acts within his power to remove
any defects in the title which existed at the time of his conveyance to the
grantee. 146 Both of these covenants run with the land so as to benefit
139. Comment, Covenants of Title Running With the Land in California, 49 CAL.
L. REv. 931, 933 (1961).
140. See text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 75-76 supra.
142. See CAL. Civ. CODE 954 (enacted in 1872).
143. See statutory proposals following note 158 infra.
144. POWELL, supra note 123, 908-909 at 1039-41. Technically, there are two
distinct common law covenants: the covenant of quiet enjoyment and the covenant of
general warranty. By the latter, the covenantor agrees to compensate the covenantee
for any losses caused by a failure of title because of the assertion of a superior title
by a third party. Tropico Land & Improvement Co. v. Lambourn, 170 Cal. 33, 38, 148
P. 206, 208 (1915). By a covenant of quiet enjoyment, the covenantor warrants that
the covenantee will not be disturbed because of the failure of his title. For practical
purposes, these covenants are "identical in scope and operation." POWELL, supra note
123, 909 at 1041. Therefore they are treated herein as one covenant.
145. Platner v. Vincent, 187 Cal. 443, 202 P. 655 (1921); McGary v. Hastings, 39
Cal. 360 (1870).
146. POWELL, supra note 123, 910 at 1041.
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grantees of the covenantee, 147 and since the statute of limitations for
actions on them does not necessarily commence at the time they are
made, they are frequently described as "future covenants.' 14 Thus, if
the covenantee's grantee is ousted under a paramount title extant at the
time of the making of the covenant, he will have a cause of action on the
covenant against the covenantor. 149
Since the common law covenants of title reach all defects and are not
subject to the many exceptions contained in the standard title policy
limiting the insurer's liability, purchasers of residential property should
be encouraged to demand the common law covenants from their sellers.
This would provide covenantees with the possibility of recourse against
their sellers for any title defects not covered in their title policies. If this
practice were followed, and absent an assignment of the policy, a
grantor-covenantor who has breached his title covenant would frequent-
ly succeed in recouping at least some of his losses from his own title
insurer, for, as has been mentioned, the standard title policy obligates
the insurer to indemnify the insured for any losses he sustains in
breaching a title covenant given his successors by reason of a defect
covered by his policy. 5 °
Perhaps one way to accomplish this goal of providing additional
protection to the grantee would be to expand the covenants implied in
the statutory grant deed to include the future English covenants. Such a
reform would also augment the title assurance of remote grantees since,
unlike the future covenants, those presently implied in the grant deed do
not run with the land.'' A suggestion to achieve that end statutorily will
be found in the next section. 52
STATUTORY PROPOSALS
As noted throughout this article, the author has drafted several
proposed statutes which, if enacted, he believes would cure the deficien-
147. CAL. Civ. CODE §1463.
148. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 136, at 775.
149. CASNER & LEACH, supra note 136, at 775-76. Yet, if a future covenant is
broken before the covenantee transfers his interest to a third party, the covenant is trans-
formed into a chose in action which, though assignable, does not automatically pass to
the transferee. Id. Absent an assignment of the chose in action, the transferee has no
more rights than he would have if the covenantor had given only a present covenant.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §954.
150. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
151. Notwithstanding the use of the words "his assigns" in Civil Code Section 1113,
which provides for the statutory grant deed, it has been held that the implied covenant
against encumbrances, as distinguished from conveyances, does not run with the land.
McPike v. Heaton, 131 Cal. 109, 111, 63 P. 179, 180 (1900); Babb v. Weemer, 225
Cal. App. 2d 546, 551-52, 37 Cal. Rptr. 553, 536 (1964).
152. See statutory proposals following note 158 infra.
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cies which he perceives in the present methods of title assurance in
California. As with most attempts to formulate statutory solutions to
complex or technical problems, there are undoubtedly imperfections in
these suggestions. Nevertheless, it is hoped that these recommendations,
either in their present form or in some modified form, will be enacted by
the California Legislature and will serve to enhance the degree of title
assurance customarily afforded purchasers of residential real property.
The first statutory proposal is intended to require title companies in-
sure not only against matters of record which are not excepted to in the
policy, but also against matters actually or constructively known to them
and which are not discoverable in the official records or excepted to in
the policy:"'
Wherever in a policy of title insurance, or in a title insurance
binder, or in a preliminary title report issued by one in the busi-
ness of issuing title insurance, there appears language limiting the
liability of the issuer of such policy, binder, or report to compensate
the insured or purchaser thereof for such losses as the insured or
purchaser might suffer as the result of the record title to the prop-
erty described in the policy, binder, or report being other than as
described -therein, "record," or any word or words of like import,
shall be deemed to include all matters within the actual or con-
structive knowledge of the issuer, including but not limited to mat-
ters affecting title which are reasonably discoverable within the
files and records of the issuer.
The following statute, if enacted, would insure that purchasers of title
policies be given an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the distinc-
tion between standard and extended title coverage and to select which
type of coverage they desire:5'
Before issuing an owner's or mortgagor's policy of insurance
insuring title to real property situate in this State, an issuer shall
inform the purchaser thereof of the distinction between standard
and extended coverage and whether and upon what conditions
extended coverage is available from the issuer, and shall obtain
a written statement from the purchaser that the provisions of this
section have been satisfied. If an issuer issues a standard owner's
or mortgagor's policy without complying with the provisions of this
section, the standard policy so issued shall be deemed to be a policy
of extended coverage in a face amount equal to the price paid by
the beneficiary thereunder in purchasing the property described
in the policy or to the value of said property at the time the policy
is issued, whichever is greater.
153. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 17-45 supra.
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Since the typical purchaser of title insurance seldom distinguishes the
marketability of title form the marketability of land, the law should give
effect to his reasonable expectation that both are insured. 155 The follow-
ig proposal should accomplish that end:
Whenever in a policy of title insurance, the "marketability" of
the title described therein is insured, -the "marketability" of the land
to which the title relates, as well as the title, shall be deemed
insured.
Because there are no legitimate reasons to preclude the assignment of
title policies, a statute making them assignable is suggested below. 156
However, a proviso has been added to preclude the assignee from
collecting both upon the policy and upon any title covenants given him
by his assignor for identical losses. This proposal would also allow the
parties to agree that the mere transfer of title would not effect an
assignment of the policy so that the grantor would be able in some
instances to retain ownership of the policy and thus be entitled to
indemnification by the insurer in the event that he is found liable upon
any title covenants he has given:
Any conveyance by an insured under a title insurance policy
shall, notwithstanding any provisions in the policy to the contrary,
constitute an assignment to the conveyee of the policy, which assign-
ment shall be binding on the insurer; provided that the insured and
his conveyee may agree in writing that the conveyance shall con-
stitute no such assignment, and provided further that if -the con-
veyee shall have any claims against his grantor upon any cove-
nants of title given him by the latter with respect to the -title
insured upon the policy, the conveyee shall offset against his
claim or claims upon such covenant or covenants any -and all
amounts to which he is entitled under the policy.
The following proposal would expose title insurers to tort liability for
negligent misrepresentations of the state of title and thereby recognize
that title insurers in California have assumed the role of title abstractors
as well as insurers:157
There is implicit in every policy of title insurance and in every
preliminary report on title and in every title policy binder respecting
title to real property situate in this State a covenant on the part of
the issuer thereof that the issuer will indemnify the beneficiary of
the policy, or purchaser of the report or binder, for any and all
losses which the beneficiary or purchaser might incur as the result
155. See text accompanying notes 56-61 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 62-78 supra.
157. See text accompanying notes 96-119 supra.
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of his reasonable reliance on the description of title in the policy,
report, or binder in all cases where that description is inaccurate,
incomplete or otherwise erroneous because of the negligence of
the issuer in examining or reporting the state of the title. This
covenant shall be deemed a part of every such policy, report, or
binder by operation of law, and any provision in such policy,
report, or binder which is inconsistent with the implication of such
a covenant shall be void and of no effect.
Two of the major theses of this article are that common law methods
of title assurance should be revived in California and that remote
grantees ought to receive the benefit of such covenants." 8 The follow-
ing two proposals are designed to incorporate into the statutory grant
deed the future English covenants, which the author believes are ade-
quate for most purposes, and to increase the rights of remote grantees
under the present English covenants:
All covenants of title with respect to real property situate in this
State shall run with the land unless -there is express language in the
covenants to the contrary.
From the use of the word "grant" in any conveyance by which
an estate of inheritance or fee-simple is to be passed, the following
covenants, .and none other, on the part of the grantor for himself
and his heirs to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, are implied, unless
restrained by express terms contained in such conveyance:
1. That the grantee, his assigns and heirs, shall have quiet and
peaceable enjoyment and possession of the estate described in the
conveyance, and that the grantor shall warrant and defend the
grantee, his assigns and heirs, against the lawful claims of all per-
sons to said estate or any part thereof.
2. That the grantor shall do, execute, or cause to be done or
executed all such further acts, deeds, or things for the better,
more perfectly, and absolutely conveying and assuring the estate
described in the conveyance to the grantee, his assigns and heirs,
as the grantees, his assigns and heirs, may reasonably request.
This last proposed statute is designed to achieve two purposes: to entitle
remote grantees to the benefits of the implied title covenants and to
encourage the use of the future title covenants in California. The present
English covenants have not been included in this statute because in most
instances the future covenants will provide sufficient title assurance, and
because inclusion of the present covenants might make it difficult for the
statutory proposal to win acceptance in view of the fact that these latter
covenants may expose the covenantor to liability in instances where
158. See text accompanying notts 131-152 supra.
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there has been no assertion of an adverse claim (for example, instances
where the owner of the adverse claim has not asserted it).159
CONCLUSION
Title insurance is far from a meaningless method of title assurance,
for it provides the insured with protection against nearly all recorded
defects and many off-record defects. Additionally, it creates a "deep
pocket" from which the insured may recoup losses which he suffers
because of paramount claims. Nevertheless, these advantages can be
improved by implementing the changes in the law outlined above and by
drawing upon the common law vehicles of assuring title, which have
long been neglected in California. Perhaps the reforms suggested in this
article will have no appreciable impact upon the number of recoveries
against title insurance companies in California. Yet, in this state, where
title insurers hold a near monopoly on the title assurance business, and
where the typical home buyer has little recourse except against his title
insurer, it would not seem to impose an undue burden upon the insurers
to enact the statutory measures proposed herein and encourage sellers
of land to give greater guarantees of title than is now the practice. In
view of the comparatively short limitation period for acquiring title by
adverse possession in California, these recommendations are unlikely
to impose unreasonably long periods of exposure to liability upon either
insurers or grantors.160
159. See generally POWELL, supra note 123, 905-907 at 1036-39.
160. The general statutory period for perfecting title by adverse possession in Cali-
fornia is five years. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. §318; CAL. Crv. CoDo §1007. Of course,
not all adverse claims are barred by the passage of the requisite statutory period, e.g.,
the claim of a remainderman whose right to possession has not yet vested. See Woman's
Home and Foreign Missionary Soc'y of the Presbytery of Los Angeles v. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust and Savings Ass'n, 15 Cal. App. 2d 682, 59 P.2d 1060 (1936).
